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In view of the Baltic countries’ anticipated accession to the European Union 
(EU), the present study attempts to highlight the reasons for the EU’s 
involvement with the problems of the Russian-speaking* 1 minorities in Estonia 
and Latvia. It analyses the frequently expressed concern of Western observers 
over the possible deterioration of Estonian-Russian, Latvian-Russian, and 
consequently, EU-Russian relations in the case of EU enlargement to the Baltic 
states considering the controversial Estonian and Latvian policies towards their 
Russian-speakers and Russia’s harsh reactions to them. The fundamental 
questions to be answered in this work are the following: why does the European 
Union actively condition the membership of Estonia and Latvia in the EU upon 
the integration of the Russian-speaking minorities into Estonian and Latvian 
societies? What implications will the EU’s enlargement into Estonia and Latvia 
have upon Russia’s behaviour towards the Russian-speaking minorities residing 
there?
The study consists of four sections. Section one generally outlines the EU 
and the overall international interference with the issues related to the position 
of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia and establishes the 
main concerns of the international community in this area. The paper proceeds 
to examine the geopolitical dimension of the continuing EU involvement with 
the issue of minorities in the two countries; namely, the concern for the 
suspected Russia’s aspirations to use the Russian-speakers for exercising 
pressure on Estonia and Latvia, thus threatening the security of the enlarged 
Union. Section three provides an overview of the evolution of the 
confrontational Estonian and Latvian relations with Russia in order to establish 
the reasons behind the stances held by the actors in the dispute and examine the 
degree of potential danger behind Russia’s rhetoric concerning the Russian- 
speakers. Finally, section four attempts to outline the implications of the EU’s 
enlargement into Estonia and Latvia upon Russia’s behaviour towards the 
Russian-speaking minorities in those countries through analysing the possible 
measures of pressure from the Russian side and the probability of public
' This paper is part of the RSC Research Project: “The Eastward Enlargement of the European 
Union: the Case of the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania". I would like to thank Nils 
Muizhnieks for his valuable comments on the draft of this paper. The text was last revised in 
July 1999
1 The category of "Russian-speakers" includes all those who regard Russian as their native 
language or the principal language of communication (mostly Russians, Ukrainians and 
Belarussans, but also many Jews, Poles and representatives o f other ethnic groups). This term, 
although somewhat vague, still appears to be the most appropriate one to describe the above 



























































































support for possible attempts by Russia to regain influence in the Baltics, using 
the Russian-speaking minorities to project its interests.
1. EU INVOLVEMENT WITH MINORITY ISSUES IN ESTONIA AND 
LATVIA: CONSIDERATIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS
The collapse of the communist system in Eastern and Central Europe was met 
with enthusiasm in the West, and the desire of the new democracies to join the 
European Union was viewed as legitimate and logical. The accession process of 
these countries to the EU seems irreversible at this point. However, the 
enlargement project has confronted the EU with new challenges that have 
compelled it to apply a strict policy of conditionality in its relations with the 
applicant states. Thus, the 1993 Copenhagen European Council required the 
associated countries to ensure, among other things, “stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities”.2
In the Estonian and Latvian cases, the EU (as well as other influential 
international organisations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the UN, 
and others) has mostly been concerned with the problem of statelessness that 
emerged in the two countries due to the decision taken by their governments to 
base their citizenship policies upon the principle of legal continuity of the pre- 
WWI1 Estonian and Latvian Republics. Upon the restoration of their 
independence in 1991, both countries granted citizenship only to those persons 
who were citizens before 1940 (year of annexation of Estonia and Latvia by the 
USSR), and to their direct descendants.3 The Russian-speaking communities, 
most of which were formed in Estonia and Latvia during the post-WWII years 
as a result of large-scale in-migration from other Soviet republics, were, thus, 
rendered stateless. In this way, initially about one third of the population of 
each country who, from the point of view of the policy-makers represented the 
consequences of the illegal Soviet annexation of the Baltics, were excluded 
from the citizenry. Today, about 27% of Latvia’s population are stateless.4 In
2 Commission of the European Communities, The Europe Agreements and Beyond: A 
Strategy to Prepare the Countries o f Central and Eastern Europe fo r  Accession. 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(94) 361 final, Luxembourg, 1994, 
1.
3Lowell Barrington, " The Domestic and International Consequences o f Citizenship in the 
Soviet Successor States", Europe-Asia Studies, Voi. 47, no. 5., 1995, 739.
4 UNDP, Human Development Report fo r  Latvia, 1997, (Riga: UNDP, 1997), 53; the report of 
August 1998 gives the figure of 26.5%, (“Human Rights and Social Integration in the 



























































































Estonia, the figure is approximately 13%; however, there is also a large number 
of those who opted for the citizenship of the Russian Federation - about 8%.5
Yet, the policies chosen by the governments of Estonia and Latvia were 
supported by a number of convincing arguments. Issues of historical justice, 
sovereignty, national security and demography collided with considerations of 
human rights and minority rights. Besides, the Estonian and Latvian cases 
revealed some shortcomings of international law in the field of nationality. 
Thus, the approach Estonia and Latvia adopted with respect to their citizenship 
policies was initially approved of by the UNHCR, the Council of Europe, the 
OSCE, and other international organisations, as this approach was in formal 
accordance with the norms of international law.6
Later, however, it appeared that the naturalisation provisions of the 
Estonian and, particularly, Latvian citizenship law7 did not result in a rapid 
reduction of the number of stateless persons. Rather, there emerged a general 
discouragement of non-citizens to apply for naturalisation as the procedure was 
viewed as humiliating and too demanding. The 1998 survey revealed that 33% 
of non-citizens in Latvia viewed naturalisation is humiliating; 42% doubted 
their ability to pass the language exam, 40% - to pass the history exam.8 This 
problem, aggravated by the Estonian and Latvian nationalising policies in the 
field of language and education, raised concern on the part of the international 
community.
The EU took measures to influence the situation by applying its 
conditionality policy to Estonia and Latvia where membership in the EU is
Affairs and LR Naturalisation Board in Association with UNDP fo r the UNDP Regional 
Meeting in Yalta 2-4 September 1998 - "Human Rights for Human Development", 10). 
sEstonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Citizenship Statistics", Estonia Today. Estonian 
Foreign Ministry's Fact Sheet, March 19, 1998,
http://www.vm.ee/eng/estoday/1998/03cits.html.) NOTE: in Estonia, non-citizens have the 
right to participate in the local elections. However, they cannot run for office.
6Fran?oise Girard, "The Latvian and Estonian Laws on Citizenship and the Problem of 
Statelessness in International Law", paper presented at the Third Annual Convention o f the 
Association for the Study o f Nationalities, New York, April 18, 1998, 10.
7The 1994 Latvian Law on Citizenship, established the so-called “window system” of 
naturalisation allowing only certain age groups to apply for citizenship each year. Those 
between the age of 16 and 20 could apply in 1996, between 20 and 25 - in 1997 and so on 
(this applied only to the ones bom in Latvia). Those bom outside Latvia could start applying 
only by 2001.
8 Baltic Data House, The Programme fo r Studies and Activities "Towards a Civic Society". 
Report on the Results o f Stages 1 and 2: Focus Group Discussions. Survey o f Ixitvian 




























































































regarded as their foreign policy priority. The Commission’s Opinion on Latvia’s 
application for membership in the EU stated that:
Latvia needs to take measures to accelerate naturalisation procedures to enable the 
Russian-speaking non-citizens to become better integrated into Latvian society. It 
should also pursue its efforts to ensure general equality o f treatment for non­
citizens and minorities, in particular for access to professions and participation in 
9the democratic process.
Estonia received almost identical recommendations.9 10
Committed to the principles and values of liberal democracy, the EU 
expects the associated countries to accept them as well, seeing the enlargement 
as a “major opportunity for Europe to unite under democratic conditions”.11 
Thus, the fact that today a significant share of Estonian and Latvian populations 
still remains excluded from participation in the decision-making process in their 
countries of residence represents a major concern for the EU, as it poses a 
challenge to the aspiration of truly democratic political arrangements in these 
countries.
Ambassador Gunter Weiss of the Delegation of the European Commission 
in Latvia, sees the integration of the Latvian society as Latvia’s top domestic 
priority.12 As he points out, the EU strives to “contribute to a better 
understanding of Latvia’s obvious choice for its future: to consolidate the unity 
of the state and shape a united society in order to avoid internal frictions, and to 
reintegrate Latvia into the democratic society by its integration into the 
European community of peoples”.13 Thus, by requiring the Estonian and 
Latvian governments to accelerate naturalisation, eliminate the problem of 
statelessness, and take action in order to consolidate their societies, as well as 
by promoting social harmony by way of, among other things, supporting the
9 The European Commission. Commission’s Opinion on Latvia’s Application for Membership 
of the European Union, July 16, 1997, available at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgla/enlarge/agenda2000_en/op_latvia/contents.htm 
‘“Commission’s Opinion on Estonia is available at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgla/enlarge/agenda2000_en/op_estonia/contents.htm 
1 Fraser Cameron, "The European Union and The Challenge of Enlargement”, in: Maresceau, 
Marc (ed ), Enlarging the European Union. Relations Between the EU and Central and 
Eastern Europe (London and New York: Longman, 1997), 241.
12 Delegation of the European Commission in Latvia/Latvian Institute o f International Affairs, 
“Building an Inclusive Society for Europe: the Challenge Facing Latvia”, International 
Conference Report, Riga, Latvia, May 4-5, 1998, Chief Rapporteur: Nils Muizhnieks, forward 





























































































National Programme for Latvian Language Training, the EU has been 
reasserting its role as “a major producer of order in the new Europe”14.
EU involvement, both direct and facilitated by the efforts of the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE and other international 
actors, has generally led to positive results.15 Most importantly, it has helped to 
lift the taboo off the topic of citizenship and minority problems. Throughout 
1997-1998, a debate on integration of the Latvian society was launched in the 
mass media and amendments to the Citizenship Law began to be seriously 
considered by the political elite. The EU played a major role in the promotion of 
this debate. As a result of pressure from international organisations on the one 
hand and Russia on the other, as well as owing to the activities of local NGO’s, 
Latvia introduced amendments to its Citizenship Law abolishing the “windows” 
system and granting, upon the request of their parents, citizenship to stateless 
children bom in Latvia after independence.16 The political will to join the EU 
was the major driving force behind this decision,17 although the domestic 
context played a significant role as well. In December 1998, Estonia took a 
similar step with regard to stateless children bom in the country after 
independence.
Moreover, one of the major aims of the international community in Estonia 
and Latvia was to minimise the potential for ethnic conflict. Today it can be 
stated that the perceived possibility of an outbreak of ethic violence that existed 
in the early 1990’s has been largely eliminated partly due to the impact of 
international preventive diplomacy, and the EU in particular.18
14 Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, “EU Governance and Central and Eastern Europe -  Where 
are the Boundaries?”, Occasional Paper in Human Capital and Mobility Network: The 
European Policy Process, No. 35, 1997, (University of Essex, 1997), 13.
l5For a comprehensive study of international involvement with the Russian-speaking 
minorities in Estonia and Latvia, see: Hanne-Margret Birckenbach, Preventive Diplomacy 
Through Fact-Finding. How International Organizations Review The Conflict Over 
Citizenship In Estonia and Latvia (Munster/Hamburg/ London: LIT Verlag, 1997).
l6The abolition of the “window” system gave the opportunity to apply for naturalisation to all 
those interested irrespective of age. The change of the law became possible after the 
favourable outcome of the national referendum that took place on October 3, 1998. However, 
the referendum was passed with a minimum majority (53% in favour of the amendments, the 
rest - against, which implies that the outcome was achieved owing to the votes of the non- 
Lativans with citizenship who constitute 16% of the citizenry).
17 As is often pointed out, one of the major driving force behind the adoption of the Latvian 
Citizenship law itself in 1994 after extensive political battles between 1991 and 1994, was the 
desire of Latvia for membership in the Council of Europe.
l8Hanne-Margret Birckenbach, “North-Eastern Estonia: Why No Violent Conflict?", Paper 
presented at the Third Annual Convention o f the Association fo r  the Study o f Nationalities 




























































































These developments can only be evaluated positively.19 However, they 
were achieved with great difficulty and over a long period of time. International 
pressure has been accompanied by reluctance of the Estonian and Latvian 
governments to yield to it, as the requirements they were expected to fulfil were 
considered excessive.20 The conflicting values and interests of the different 
players in the citizenship dispute as well as the vague provisions of 
international law on the questions of nationality and minority rights did not 
allow for the speedy resolution of the problem. On the EU part, only mild 
pressure could be applied considering the historical complexity and legal 
peculiarity of the Estonian and Latvian situation and the varying practices of the 
EU member states in terms of minority and citizenship policies.21 However, the 
authority that the EU has in the eyes of the local decision-makers has had a 
significant impact.
Thus, on the one hand, international efforts can be praised for having 
resulted in important changes to Estonian and Latvian citizenship legislation 
that initially seemed unachievable and, even more importantly, for having 
initiated a discussion of the conflicting interests of the different sides. On the 
other hand, however, international pressure did not bring immediate results 
allowing the uncertainty in the position of the Russian-speakers, especially 
stateless persons, to persist for years. This uncertainty has still not been 
overcome in spite of some legal improvements that have taken place since 1991 
in the two Baltic states.22
19 The degree of effectiveness of diplomatic pressure applied by the EU as well as by other 
international actors and the actual impact o f this pressure upon the decision-making process 
requires a separate detailed analysis. A special study is necessary in order to establish the 
existence of a causal link between such pressure and the actions of the states.
20 See, for example, Toomas Hendrik lives, Minister o f Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Estonia, Reply to Max van der Stoel, OSCE High Commissioner fo r  National Minorities, 
Tallinn, June 4, 1997.
21 For discussion of these issues, see, for example: Nicola Piper, Racism, Nationalism and 
Citizenship. Ethnic Minorities in Britain and Germany (Aldlershot, Brookfield USA, 
Singapore, Sydney: Ashgale, 1998); Adrian Favell, Philosophies o f Integration. Immigration 
and the Idea o f Citizenship in France and Britain (University o f Warwick: Center for 
Research in Ethnic Relations, 1998); John Rex, Ethnic Minorities in the Modem Nation State. 
Working Papers in the Theory o f Multiculluralism and Political Integration (University of 
Warwick: Center for Research in Ethnic Relations, 1996); Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner 
(ed.), The Politics o f Multiculluralism in the New Europe. Racism, Identity and Community 
(London and New York: Zed Books Ltd., 1997).
22The status o f Estonia’s non-citizens was defined by the Law on Aliens adopted on July 8, 
1993. Latvia’s non-citizens remained in a legal vacuum until April 12, 1995 when ‘The Law 
on the Status o f Former USSR Citizens who Have Nether Latvian nor Another State’s 




























































































Although the regulations concerning the legal status of non-citizens and 
provisions regarding their identification documents are clearer today than they 
were a few years ago, the problems are far from being resolved in practical 
terms. Besides, the on-going attempts to restrict the laws on language and 
education cause frustration on the part of the Russian-speakers who feel 
threatened by the future developments in these areas, particularly as far as the 
prospect of transferring secondary education entirely into the Estonian or , 
Latvian languages, respectively, is concerned. As demonstrated by a variety of 
social surveys, the status of being a non-citizen is connected with feelings of 
insecurity and the so-called “alien’s passport” is viewed as a discriminatory 
document.23 In spite of the changes to the Citizenship Law, the number of 
stateless persons is likely to remain high for many years, particularly in Latvia, 
as the process was hardly taking place before the 1998 amendments to the Law 
on Citizenship. Presently, naturalisation requirements remain too demanding for 
many, the fee for naturalisation remains high (about 80% of the minimum 
salary) and the administrative procedure remains quite complicated and lengthy. 
Besides, the motivation of the Russian-speakers to naturalise has been 
undermined by the long years of exclusion producing negative attitudes towards 
the procedure as such.
These problem areas confirm the insufficiency of mere legislative 
adaptations for the creation of integrated democratic societies in the two 
countries and imply that the international involvement in Estonia and Latvia has 
not exhausted itself. Further promotion of democratic stability and the desire to 
avoid the segregation of the Estonian and Latvian societies primarily on the 
linguistic basis are the main reasons for the continuing EU involvement with 
integration issues and human rights in Estonia and Latvia. However, although 
foremost, these are not the only reasons for the EU’s interference with the 
problems of the Russian-speaking minorities. Its geopolitical dimension will be 
examined in the next section.
23The 1998 “Towards a Civic Society” survey revealed that 73% of non-citizens in Latvia 
associate their status with the feeling of insecurity, 47% - with the feeling of humiliation, 67% 
- with discrimination at the labour market (Baltic Data House 1998, fig. 6, p. 26); 60% view 
the alien’s passport as a discriminatory document.(lbid., fig. 10, p. 28) In Estonia, 70% of 
non-citizens claimed that their status was associated with perceiving constant insecurity and 
was the underlying reason for the difficulties in finding a job. The alien’s passport is viewed 
by 80% of non-Estonians as an insult. (“Non-Estonians are Dissatisfied With Aliens 
Passports”, in: The Open Estonia Foundation Research Project (Tallinn: Open Estonia 




























































































2. THE SECURITY DIMENSION OF EU INTERFERENCE WITH 
MINORITY ISSUES IN ESTONIA AND LATVIA: THE CONCERN 
OVER RUSSIA’S BEHAVIOUR IN CASE OF ENLARGEMENT
Despite the quite similar problems faced by the Russian-speaking communities 
in Estonia and Latvia, Estonia was invited by the European Commission for its 
first round of accession negotiations, but Latvia was not. This fact provoked 
extensive debates, analyses and speculations as to the reasons for this decision. 
Estonia has definitely made greater progress as far as the pace of naturalisation 
is concerned. Over 100 000 people had been naturalised in Estonia by March 
1998, while the figure for Latvia is just over 12 000.24 Besides, the Opinion was 
released before the amendments to the Latvian Law on Citizenship were 
introduced; in fact, it greatly contributed to their adoption which again suggests 
that the EU conditionality policy is effective and should be continued. 
However, as the Commission’s Opinion implies, Estonia is also far from having 
solved its problems with the Russian-speakers, particularly non-citizens. In 
general, the weaknesses highlighted by the Commission in both the Estonian 
and the Latvian case are very similar. Why then was Estonia selected for 
negotiations in 1997 in spite of the unsatisfactory situation with the Russian- 
speakers, and why was Latvia not selected?
One of the assumptions holds that the citizenship/naturalisation criterion 
was not the decisive one, and economic considerations played a greater role. 
The obvious conclusion drawn from this suggests that the EU has accepted the 
fact that large non-citizen communities will remain in the two countries for 
years to come, and that Latvia should first of all improve its economic 
performance in order to be invited, devoting secondary attention to the problem 
of the Russian-speakers. However, shortly after the Opinion was issued, the 
Accession Partnerships with Estonia and Latvia made it explicit that the 
facilitation of the naturalisation and the integration of non-citizens and stateless 
children are the top priorities.25
Rather than trying to explain why Estonia was invited for negotiations and 
Latvia was not, and in which way Estonia has performed better, it could be 
more appropriate to find an explanation as to why the EU has in fact selected
24 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Citizenship Statistics", Estonia Today. Estonian 
Foreign Ministry’s Fact Sheet, March 19, 1998; Republic o f Latvia State Naturalisation 
Board. Naturalisation Process in Latvia 1995-1999.(Riga, 1999).
25 The European Commission, Directorate General for External Relations: Europe and the 
New Independent States. Accession Partnership -Latvia.(1998); The European Commission, 
Directorate General for External Relations: Europe and the New Independent States. 




























































































one of the Baltic states for the first round rather than leaving the whole Baltic 
region in the “pre-in” group. One of the assumptions might be that although 
none of the Baltic states has satisfied the necessary conditions, there was a 
principal necessity for the EU to include at least one of the Baltic countries in 
the first round of negotiations for geopolitical reasons.
It is obvious that the EU cannot ignore the implications of its enlargement 
for Estonia’s and Latvia’s relations with Russia, and citizenship and minority 
issues in the two Baltic countries are of major importance in this area. In the 
case of accession, the Eastern borders of Estonia and Latvia will constitute the 
EU-Russian border. Taking this into account, it becomes evident that the 
situation of the Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia is of direct concern to 
the EU also for security reasons. As pointed out by Karen Smith, “the 
application of conditionality competes with other considerations of foreign 
policy, such as commercial and geopolitical/strategic interests”.26
Therefore, it may be suggested that the inclusion of Estonia in the first 
round of negotiations was largely determined by geopolitical considerations. As 
has been argued, “the inclusion of a Baltic country was particularly important in 
sending a signal to the applicants and to Russia that this would not be just a 
central European enlargement”. 27 Such a step implied that the Baltics belong to 
the “Western domain”. A Latvian observer writes that “if at least one of the 
three Baltic states achieves EU membership in the first round of enlargement, 
that will be an accomplishment for the other two as well, because EU 
membership would put an end to the geopolitical problem which the Baltic 
states faced after the announcement of the first round of NATO expansion”28 
(when none of the Baltic states were included - J. D).
Undoubtedly, Russia’s behaviour towards the Russian-speaking 
minorities in the two Baltic states is one of the main considerations that 
motivates the EU to continue its involvement with minority problems in Estonia 
and Latvia.
26 Karen Elizabeth Smith, ‘The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with 
Third Countries: How Effective?”, EU1 Working Paper SPS No. 98/7 (Florence: European 
University Institute, 1997), 4.
27 Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards (London: The Royal 
Institute o f International Affairs, 1998), 114.
28 Zaneta Ozolina, “Latvia and the European Union: Before and After Amsterdam”, paper 
presented at the Steering Committee Meeting o f the International Research Project "The 
Eastward Enlargement o f the European Union: the Case o f the Baltic States - Estonia. iMtvia 




























































































So far, Russian politicians have been attacking Estonia and Latvia quite 
harshly, accusing them of pursuing a policy involving human rights violations29 
with regard to the Russian-speakers residing there. Russian representatives have 
raised the issue of discrimination towards the Russian-speaking population at 
the level of international organisations such as the UN and the Council of 
Europe, thus trying to bring international attention to the existing problems.30 
These activities, as well as Russia’s considerations about introducing economic 
sanctions against Estonia and Latvia and the unveiled nationalistic rhetoric of 
some Russian hard-liners, have aroused negative feelings in Estonia and Latvia 
where perceptions of a Russian threat are acute. Suspicions of Russia’s 
determination to reinstate its influence in the Baltic region have become 
pronounced among Estonians and Latvians.
Such suspicions are present also in Western Europe. Due to its current 
economic and political instability, Russia is regarded as unpredictable and 
capable of collapsing back into authoritarianism. In spite of assurances of the 
Russian leaders that Russia would not abandon its democratic path, the 
international community does not seem to have confidence in its stable future. 
Although the EU has generally tried to be optimistic about Russia,31 concerns 
over its possibly unfavourable behaviour have been voiced also in connection 
with EU enlargement. As one analyst notes, “If the Union of fifteen member 
states would be enlarged to central and east European countries and specifically 
in the case of enlargement to the Baltic states, the uncertainty with regard to 
Moscow’s policy towards its near abroad might grow.”32 He goes on, quoting
29Thus, for example, on February 8, 1994, Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev accused 
Estonia of "ethnic cleansing” and announced a plan "to protect the interests o f ethnic Russians 
in the former Soviet republics”.
30For instance, on October 15, 1997, several Russian and Ukrainian representatives to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe signed a Written Declaration in which 
Estonia and Latvia were accused of discriminating the Russian-speakers on the basis of 
ethnicity and language.30 It was stressed that, “the denial a priori to grant citizenship to some 
sectors of the population violates the basic principles of international law - the presumption of 
innocence. This is nothing but "preventive discrimination” which in reality is a kind of 
political totalitarianism which the Council of Europe opposes". It was further stated that 
Russia "could not possibly tolerate" the existing situation and would "continue to protect the 
Russian and Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia." An appeal to the Council of 
Europe "to take practical steps to improve the situation" was made. (Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly, Written Declaration no. 266, on the Situation o f the Russian- 
Speaking Population in Latvia and Estonia, Doc. 7951, October 15, 1997, par. 2, available at: 
http://stars.coe.fr/doc97/edoc7951 htm.)
3lSee: Commission of the European Communities. The European Union and Russia: the 
Future Relationship (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC, 1995).
32 Franco Algieri, “In Need of a Comprehensive Approach: the European Union and Possible 




























































































the Federal Trust: “ Irredentism, a thrust to regain hegemony, genuine 
difficulties over Russian minorities, are all potential tinder if political 
conditions in Moscow change”.33
This concern becomes especially pronounced considering the fact that 
Russia is not likely to become an EU member state. Some analysts worry that 
Russia may perceive the EU enlargement to the Baltics as an attempt to recreate 
a divided Europe.34 As pointed out by Grabbe and Hughes:
There is a danger that the non-applicants left outside the EU and NATO, such as 
Russia and Ukraine will feel threatened by the enlarged organizations on their 
doorsteps if their own prospects for joining are remote. ( .. .)  The question of 
relations with non-applicants is especially important where there are extensive 
economic linkages or populations of mixed ethnic origins ( . . .)  It is possible that 
the security aspects of EU enlargement could become more of an issue in Russian 
foreign policy.35
However, other observers suspect Russia of uncertain great power aspirations 
regardless of the prospect of enlargement. As stated by one author, in the case 
of non-enlargement, “[t]he whole central and east European region will remain 
a grey area in security terms open to attempts on the part of Russia to regain 
influence over that region.”36
The Baltic states are seen as particularly vulnerable to Russian interference 
due to their borderline position between the “East” and the “West”. Nello and 
Smith argue that,
Russia may seek to pressure the EU and the new member states, particularly the 
Baltic republics. Including one of the Baltic republics in the first wave of EU 
enlargement is seen as a way of including them all in the West’s sphere of 
influence” (...). Estonia has been mentioned as the first possible EU member state 
of the three. But Estonia has had serious difficulties with Russia (over, among 
other things, its treatment of the Russian minority), and it is not clear how the EU 
would handle a deterioration in Russian-Estonian relations.37
Managing Security in Europe: the European Union and the Challenges o f Enlargement 
(Guetersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1996), 123.
33 Ibid.
34 Susan Senior Nello and Karen E. Smith, “The Consequences of Eastern Enlargement of the 
European Union in Stages”, EUI Working Paper RSC No. 97/51 (Florence: European 
University Institute, 1998), 47.
35Grabbe and Hughes, 114.
36 Mathias Jopp, “Developing a European Security and Defense Identity: the Specific Input of 
Present and Future New Members", in: Algieri, Franco et al (eds.), Managing Security in 
Europe...(1996), 75.




























































































The current numbers of citizens of the Russian Federation in Estonia and Latvia 
add to the anxiety of the European observers. In Estonia, this number exceeds 
120 000 people.38 In Latvia, about 60 000 people have opted for Russian 
citizenship with half of them having moved to Russia.39 401As noted by the 
Reflection Group on the Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement,
In accepting Estonia and Latvia as future members, the EU will also have to 
shoulder the burden of this issue in its relations with Russia, which will continue 
to take an active interest in its citizens abroad and could well choose to extend its 
purview to the fate of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in general, even when 
EU citizens.
Similarly, Jopp argues that,
In the Baltics, the EU will have to cope with the problem related to a minority 
which largely belongs to an external power. Even though Russia seems in the 
meanwhile to have recognised that the Baltic states no longer belong to its direct 
“near abroad”, Russian interference in the Baltic states’ domestic affairs can never
be excluded and also not the use of the minority issue for exercising pressure on 
41these states.
The author considers that in this situation, the EU must first of all “insist on the 
implementation of minority rights in the Baltics (...) in order to weaken any 
intentional arguments by the Russians” and, second, “to take a firm stance vis-à- 
vis Russia by making clear that there is no possibility of the Baltic states being 
again made to become part of any new Russian empire. This would ultimately 
require a firm WEU/EU commitment to protect the territorial integrity of these 
countries should they be threatened.”42
The above-cited statements are expressed in a way that represents Russia 
as a potential source of danger to the overall security of the EU both in the 
event of EU enlargement to the Baltics and in the case of non-enlargement. A 
persisting preoccupation with the possible negative consequences of Russia’s 
behaviour towards the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltics reflects the 
caution in the authors’ perceptions of Russia as well as their overall vision of
38 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site. Citizenship Statistics, available at: 
http://www.vm.ee/eng/estoday/1998/03cits.html.
39 UNDP, 55.
40Giuliano Amato, “Minority Rights and EU Enlargement to the East”. Report o f the First 
Meeting o f the Reflection Group on the Long-Term Implications o f EU Enlargement: the 
Nature o f the New Border, Rapporteur: Judy Batt, Policy Papers, RSC No. 98/5 (Florence: 






























































































the international system in terms of opposing “spheres of influence.” However, 
a deeper insight into Russia’s position as well as into public attitudes in Russia 
and the Baltic states under study is needed in order to understand how well- 
founded the concern over the negative outcome of the complex relationship 
between Russia, Estonia/Latvia and the Russian-speaking minorities really is, 
particularly in the event that Estonia and Latvia become EU members.
3. THE BALTIC-RUSSIAN ANTAGONISM: THE DYNAMICS OF THE 
TENSION
3.1. The triadic interplay
In order to understand the nature of the current tension involving the Russian- 
speaking minority between Estonia and Latvia on the one hand, and Russia on 
the other, it is important to briefly trace back its development and observe how 
it actually came about. It will then be possible to evaluate how potentially 
threatening Russia’s attempts to protect compatriots in these countries are.
Rogers Brubaker describes the relationship between the players involved 
in a “minority” conflict in terms of a triadic nexus where the “nationalizing 
state”, the “national minority” and the “external national homeland” interact 
with one another in various ways. He speaks of each of these entities (which by 
no means constitute coherent groups) as “fields of differentiated and 
competitive positions or stances” adopted by different organisations, parties, 
movements or individuals seeking to legitimately represent these entities both to 
the internal and external actors. Actors in each field seek to monitor actions and 
relations in the other two fields. This kind of monitoring involves selective 
attention, interpretation and representation of what is going on in the two other 
external fields which often leads to “representational struggles” within a given 
field.43
The stances that the various fields take are linked to perceptions and 
representations of developments in the external filed(s). This is a complex 
relationship, as certain perceptions and representations may alter the existing 
stances or provoke new ones. Thus, commitments to stances emerge in response 
to perceived or represented developments in the external field. On the other 
hand, in the case when stances within the field are governing, they require a
43Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New 




























































































certain representation of an external field, even at the cost of deliberate 
misinterpretation.44
The nationalizing state may try to represent the national minority as 
potentially disloyal and the “homeland” as irredentist. On the other hand, 
attempts to mobilise the minority may be linked to efforts to represent the state 
as nationally oppressive. Generally, strong nationalist stances among some 
members of the interacting fields lead to the distortion of the images of the 
other “through both sincere selective perception and cynical misrepresentation.” 
Simultaneously, those members of the field initially indifferent to nationalistic 
dispositions may come to adopt pronounced nationalistic stances in response to 
the (mis)representations of perceivably threatening developments in the other 
fields45
This model also applies to the case of Estonia and Latvia where they 
represent the field of “nationalizing states”, the Russian-speakers constitute the 
“national minority”, and Russia stands as the “external homeland” (in spite of 
the fact that the majority of the Russian-speakers in the Baltics do not view it as 
such). The presently held stances of the three “fields” have crystallised 
gradually due to a number of developments.
In the periods shortly before, and right after, the restoration of 
independence in 1991, relations between the Baltic states and democratic 
Russia were friendly and co-operative, as both sides were united in their 
aspirations to do away with the Soviet centre.46 Yeltsin recognised the 
independence of the Baltic states setting no conditions and asking no guarantees 
of Estonia and Latvia with respect to the Russian-speakers. This period has 
been referred to as “the initial triumph of the democratic vision of interstate 
relations” (when the Russian government was more or less indifferent to the 
developments in the former Soviet republics focusing primarily on its relations 
with the “West”).47 The nationalistic stance was not present in Russia’s attitude 
towards the Baltics at that time. Soon, however, the friendly atmosphere was 
damaged by issues concerning the treatment of the Russian-speaking minorities
44Ibid., 68.
45lbid., 69.
46 Alexander Sergounin, “The Russia Dimension” in: Mouritzen, Hans (ed j Bordering 
Russia: Theory and prospects fo r  the Baltic Rim (Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, 
Sydney: Ashgate, 1998), 26.
47Neil Melvin, Forging the New Russian Nation: Russian Foreign Policy and the Russian- 





























































































(1992-the present), the Russian troop withdrawal (1992-1994), and NATO 
enlargement (since 1995).48
The problem of the Russian-speakers may be considered the central one, as 
it has no quick solution and is always present in connection with the other 
issues. It is obvious that the Russian democratic government that came to power 
in 1991 did not expect the unfavourable developments that the Russian- 
speakers faced in Estonia and Latvia soon after independence was achieved. 
The denial of citizenship to the Russian-speakers not only made them feel 
“cheated” (as many of them - around 40%49 - provided support for the Baltic 
independence in the late 80’s to the early 90’s), but also provoked 
dissatisfaction in Russia having become the reason for Russia’s repeated 
diplomatic attacks on the Baltics, both justified and undertaken for broader 
political purposes. Sergounin explains that contrary to Moscow’s expectations, 
the Baltic states “seemed not very obliged to Russia for liberation from the 
Soviet domination and subsequently did not hurry to express their gratitude”.50
Further developments were largely determined by both Russia’s and the 
Baltic states’ quest for identity and place in the newly-emerged international 
system. The negative trend in the Baltic-Russian relations and the formation of 
confrontational stances on both sides is explained by both the domestic and the 
international political context. Thus, the initially nationalistically “indifferent” 
Russia chose to assume the role of a “homeland” with regard to its 
“compatriots”.
The Baltic states adhered to the idea of re-establishing the “status quo 
ante” in terms of creating “classical” nation states that would closely resemble 
the ones existing during the inter-war period in spite of the virtual impossibility 
of achieving this aim due to the fundamental changes that occurred in the ethnic 
composition of these states. Hence the firm devotion of the Baltics to the 
nationalistic stance. At the same time, the Baltics chose to strive for close 
integration with Western political and security organisations, primarily the EU 
and NATO. In the meantime, Russian foreign policy concentrated on the post- 
Soviet space, and Russia’s preferences with regard to the Baltics did not 
correspond to the preferences of the Baltic states themselves. Russian foreign 
policy makers preferred a neutral position for the Baltics while the Baltic states
48 Sergounin (1998), 27.
49 Latvian Social Research Centre, in: Zepa, Brigita “Sabiedriskâ doma pârejas perioda 
Latvijâ: LatvieSu un cittautieSu uzskatu dinamika (1989-1992)” [Social attitudes in transition: 
dynamics o f the Latvians and non-Latvians” attitudes (1989-1992)], Latvijas Zinâtpu 
akadêmijas vëstis A. da|a. 1992.g. Nr. 10(543), 22.




























































































were striving for membership in Western alliances. While Russia desired to 
retain leadership in the Baltic region, the Baltic states were determined to 
distance themselves from Russia to the greatest extent possible, primarily in 
political terms. 51 Each side defined its interests in a way that did not imply 
reconciliation. Since all the actors involved were operating using realist foreign 
policy conceptions, the creation of enemy images was inevitable in both cases.
Russia’s negative reaction to the mistreatment of Russian-speakers in the 
Baltics, namely, its tactics of condemning Estonian and Latvian ethnic policies 
in the international forum and especially linking the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
to the observance of the Russian-speakers’ rights was interpreted in the Baltics 
as evidence of Russia’s ambitions to mobilise this group and eventually use it 
for retaining influence in the region, in spite of the fact that much of Russia’s 
rhetoric did not reflect the official position of the state. As one Latvian analyst 
writes, “the Baltic countries could do very little to stop Russia from using the 
ethnic Russians who reside in the Baltics as an excuse to meddle in the 
domestic affairs of the three countries and to increase its influence there”.52 At 
the same time, the existence of any discrimination of the Russian-speaking 
population in Estonia and Latvia was completely denied, but their loyalty 
towards their countries of residence continued to be questioned which is 
explicitly demonstrated by the lack of progress in the resolution of the 
citizenship problem that has lasted for many years.
The fact that Russia conditioned its troop withdrawal on the extension of 
citizenship to the Russian-speakers and observance of their human rights served 
as evidence to Estonia and Latvia of Russia’s “imperial plans” with regard to 
the region and aggravated their stance towards the Russian-speakers. As pointed 
out by Jaeger, “negotiations with Russia actually inflated the enemy image of 
the Russian speaking population in Estonia and Latvia. (...) The Russian stance 
(...) caused apprehension to the Balts and fuelled the essentialist notion 
embedding political loyalty in ethnicity.”53
51 Zaneta Ozolina, “Latvia” in Mouritzen, Hans (ed.) Bordering Russia ...(1998), 131, Olga 
Zhuryari ‘The Baltic Countries and Russia (1990-1993): Doomed to Good-Neighbourliness?” 
in: Joenniemi, Perth and Juris Prikulis (eds.) The Foreign Policies o f the Baltic States: Basic 
Issues (Riga: Centre for Baltic-Nordic History and Political Studies, 1994), 78; Aivars 
Stranga, “Baltic-Russian Relations: 1995-Beginning of 1997” in: Lejins, Atis and Zaneta 
Ozolina (eds.), Small States in a Turbulent Environment: The Baltic Perspective (Riga: 
Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 185.
52 Guntis Stamers, ‘The Ethnic Issue in Baltic-Russian Relations” in: Lejins, Atis and Daina 
Bleiere (eds.) The Baltic States. Search fo r  Security (Riga: Latvian Institute of International 
Affairs, 1996), 186.
53Ojvind Jaeger, Securitising Russia: Discursive Practices o f the Baltic States (Copenhagen 




























































































Russia’s inconsistent strong statements with regard to the Baltics were 
interpreted as threatening and were used to once again prove to the West that 
the Baltics need to become part of major Western security structures in order to 
be protected from Russia. Russian rhetoric, paradoxically, came in congruence 
with the firmly held Estonian and Latvian stance, and what Brubaker calls 
“selective representation” was extensively employed by the Balts. As 
Sergouning points out, “the Baltic states, incidentally, are very skilful in using 
Russia’s blunders to present Moscow as being in the wrong in the conflict.”54
The Russian military doctrine that envisaged the possibility of the use of 
force in the name of protecting Russian citizens abroad and the so-called 
“Karaganov doctrine” of the “near abroad” which outlined the implementation 
of the “post-imperialist” strategy in the region and achieving closer integration 
of the post-Soviet space55 were viewed as harassment in the Baltic states and 
interpreted as applicable to the Baltics in particular. As Stamers suspects, “the 
Baltic countries could be threatened if Russia were to use military or other 
pressure to force its own resolution upon ethnic policy. (...) The possibility that 
Russia may turn to military force someday is evidenced by the delays in 
withdrawing the army from the Baltics in 1992 and 1993.”56
With the war in Chechnya, the image of Russia as the enemy crystallised 
even more firmly. With increased frequency, today’s Russia became associated 
with the former Soviet regime and discussions of the Baltic-Russian relations 
developed into what has been called the “discourse of danger” 57.
Russian rhetoric concerning the protection of the Russian-speakers reached 
its peak in March-April 1998 after a demonstration of predominantly Russian- 
speaking pensioners was dispersed by the Latvian police in Riga. The use of 
force by the police was described by the Moscow mayor Luzhkov as a “flagrant 
violation of basic human rights”. Economic pressure was proposed by the 
Russian government and its implementation was actually initiated. However, 
the pressure aroused dissatisfaction among Russian-speakers (whose interests 
they were, apparently supposed to serve). In Latvia, Russia’s behaviour was 
interpreted as a “continuation of Soviet-style methods to bring back into line 
what Moscow perceives to be recalcitrant republics, [which] supports the view 
that Russia, far from pursuing a democratic and co-operative foreign policy 
with its neighbours, has adopted a revisionist zero-sum foreign policy that seeks
54 Sergounin (1998), 25.
55 Aivars Stranga, “Russia and the Security o f the Baltic States: 1991-1996" in: Atis Lejins 






























































































to intimidate and coerce in order to reassert a sphere of Russian influence over 
the space of the former Soviet Union, including the Baltics.”58 It is obvious that 
the Russian-speaking population could not escape the projection of this 
perception upon itself.
As Sergounin describes it, “part of the Baltic elites and broad public 
transformed their negative attitudes towards the Soviet centre into anti-Russian 
sentiment. For them, Russia will be a source of eternal threat posed by 
Moscow’s historical inclination to expansion and imperialism. In turn, Moscow 
can not understand why the Balts do not trust it and why “democratic” Russia 
must be responsible for what the totalitarian regime did. In fact, [the] new 
enemy image was created by both sides”.59
Although both Russian and leading Baltic political scientists admit that, in 
fact, Russia poses no military threat to the Baltic states today and has very 
limited opportunities to influence Baltic policies,60 perceptions of such a threat 
are strong. This is manifested , for example, in the Latvian National Security 
Concept which defines the main threat to Latvian security as coming “from the 
neighbouring countries in their efforts to retain the Baltic states within their 
political, economical and military influence”. It is also stated that “the external 
threat of Latvia can be related to efforts of neighbouring countries to destabilise 
internal situation in Latvia”. The “neighbouring countries” are also suspected of 
possible attempts to “interfere [in] Latvian internal affairs or to carry out 
aggressive acts”. 61 As Estonian researcher Mare Haab admits, “mistrust and 
suspicion towards Russia’s role in regional security arrangements cannot 
quickly nor easily fade in Estonia”.62
The most salient manifestation of threat perceptions among ethnic 
Estonians and Latvians is provided by social survey data. Thus, when asked by 
the Baltic Barometer III whether the Russian state represents a threat to peace 
and security of Estonia/Latvia, 81% of Estonians and 80% of Latvians replied 
“definitely” and “possibly”.63 Similarly, 81% of Estonians and 73% of Latvians
58John Eichmanis, “Latvian-Russian Relations: Ominous Signs”, (May 30, 1998), essay 
available from the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site at: http://www.mfa.gov.lv/
59 Sergounin (1998), 28.
60 Stranga (1996) 161, Sergounin (1998), 42, also discussed further.
61 For a detailed discussion of the Security Concepts o f all the three Baltic states, see: Ojvind 
Jaeger, Securitising Russia ... (1997).
62 Mare Haab, “Estonia” in: Mouritzen, Hans (ed.) Bordering Russia ...(1998), 128.
63 Richard Rose, "New Baltic Barometer III. A Survey Study", Studies in Public Policy, No. 
284 (Glasgow G1 1XH: University o f Strathclyde, 1997), question 100, p.35 By contrast, 80% 
of the Estonian Russian-speakers and 79% of Latvian Russian-speakers do not perceive the 




























































































replied that hard-line nationalist politicians in Russia “definitely” and 
“possibly” represent a threat to peace and security of the respective countries.64 
As Stranga notes, the threat from Russia is imagined rather than real.65
As public sentiments are quite strong, both the Baltic and the Russian 
right-wing nationalists are able to manipulate them for gaining electoral 
support. The confrontation between Estonia/Latvia and Russia influences the 
position of the Russian-speakers who have become hostages to the domestic 
political struggle in their respective countries, as well as to the wider 
geopolitical games of all sides. This, to a large extent, aggravates the problems 
faced by the minority population as objective evaluation of their situation 
becomes rather problematic since adherence to the stances adopted by both 
sides leads to exaggerated representation of the events.
Thus, for example, the slow naturalisation pace in Latvia and the 
acquisition of Russian citizenship by many minority representatives in Estonia 
are interpreted by Estonians and Latvians in ways congruent with their firmly 
held stance. As Jaeger describes it:
“Many find the threshold for naturalization too cumbersome or too distant to be worth 
climbing. Instead, they opt for Russian citizenship, which is subsequently securitized by 
representatives of the majority as evidence of Russia’s evil schemes to once again 
subjugate the Baltic states by establishing and, when time is due, exploiting a ‘fifth 
column’ of Russian speaking minorities.!...) Tension in minority-majority relations is 
thus reproduced and continues to sour Estonia’s and Latvia’s interstate relations with 
Russia”.66
At the same time, in Russia “emotional attitudes to the Baltic problems 
sometimes have led to exaggeration of the significance of the Baltic issues and 
to a vision of the Baltic states as ‘a source of threat to Russia’ (statement of the 
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev 19 January 1994).67
The dynamics of Estonian/Latvian relations with Russia with regard to the 
minority issue exemplify the interaction of fields in Brubaker’s triadic nexus. 
The developments in one of the fields contribute to the creation of particular 
stances in the other fields and to their subsequent strengthening by selective 
representation, and the other way around: the developments in the external 
fields are interpreted in accordance with the stances held within a given field. In 
this way, the behaviour of the nationalising states - Estonia and Latvia -
64 Ibid., question 101.
65 Stranga (1996), 161.
“ Jaeger, 28.




























































































lifies the “homeland” stance on the part of Russia which, in turn, 
^trittirtes to^he creation of the more defensive stance taken by Estonia and 
i  Sd on.
The description above shows the “chain reaction” in the development of 
Estonian-Russian and Latvian-Russian relations through the use of the minority 
issue and allows us to grasp the current atmosphere now underlying these 
relations. It follows from the analysis that the influence of the two fields - 
particularly the “nationalising states” and the “homeland” - upon each other is 
rather significant. However, this analysis is insufficient for establishing whether 
this kind of confrontation will continue and lead to potentially dangerous action 
from the Russian side in the case of EU enlargement. In order to assess the 
situation more accurately, it is necessary to take a closer look at the 
international dimension of Russia’s foreign policy towards the Baltic states and, 
further, to analyse what impact (if any) Russia’s involvement has had upon the 
behaviour and attitudes of the minorities in Estonia and Latvia. This will be 
discussed in the sections below.
3.2. The international dimension of Russian involvement with minorities in 
Estonia and Latvia
At the point when the Estonian and Latvian-Russian relations come to be 
viewed in the broader international context, another actor generally referred to 
as “the West” (which usually denotes Western Europe and the United States) 
enters the “triadic” equation which now becomes “quadratic” or perhaps even 
“pyramidal” as Western interference influences all of the actors involved . The 
West comes in as another field of differentiated stances (as the West in itself is 
a heterogeneous entity comprising different states and organisations), and thus 
the interaction of fields becomes much more complex.
As mentioned above, Russia’s involvement with the minorities in the 
Baltics is not only about its genuine concern for their rights, although this is the 
starting point. Nor is it only explained by internal political developments in 
Russia. It is also, and perhaps primarily, an issue of Russia’s self-definition and 
its still unclear status in the changing international system. The same can be 
said about Estonia and Latvia, which are both still reaffirming their state 
identity in the world. Thus, it is impossible to discuss the Russian-speaking 
minority issue in the narrow context of Estonian and Latvian bilateral relations 
with Russia. In this situation, the problems faced by the minorities acquire 
secondary importance as, irrespective of their actual situation, their existence is 





























































































The role of the West in this equation is quite complex, as its behaviour 
largely determines the behaviour of both Russia towards the Baltic states and 
the Baltic states towards Russia as well as towards their Russian-speaking 
minorities. As described by one scholar, Russia’s attitude towards the newly 
independent states of the former USSR, and the Baltic states in particular is 
conditioned “by its assessment of the overall security environment and where it 
stands in relation to the West in general (.,.)”.68 Aivars Stranga also admits that 
“Russia’s relations with the Baltic states are to a great extent dependent on the 
level, content and tone of Moscow’s relationship with the West”.69
Therefore, the whole Russian policy towards the Baltic states, particularly 
the stance it has taken with respect to the Russian-speaking minorities, has to be 
viewed through the prism of its relations with the West (which inevitably 
includes NATO and the EU, and their member-states). The defensive position 
of Estonia and Latvia should also be viewed through the same prism.
When describing the developments of Russia’s relations with the West, a 
number of observers (both Western and Russian) note that the West’s treatment 
of Russia since 1991 has not been “fair”, as it refused to recognise Russia’s 
desired international status and downgraded the importance of its role in the 
world. As admitted by MccGwire, “despite the rhetoric of partnership, the trend 
since 1991 has been away from recognising Russia’s need for symbolic equality 
as a great power.”70 This has led to an outcome where “in Russia’s perceptions 
of, and attitude towards, the West, a competitive pattern certainly prevails over 
a co-operative one...”71 The overall Western stance has been interpreted in 
Russia as an attempt to isolate it from major international developments. Fears 
of a possible re-creation of division lines in Europe by enlarging NATO, first of 
all, are pronounced in Russia. As one of the leading Russian security scholars 
has expressed it,
(O)ne of the important reasons for Russia’s fixation on the near abroad was that it 
was not treated fairly in Europe and in many areas of the world on global issues, 
starting with arms control. ( .. .)  Russia was perceived as a successor of the Soviet
68Michael MccGwire, “Russia and Security in Europe”, in: Dawisha, Karen (ed.) The 
International Dimension o f Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States o f 
Eurasia (Armonk, London: M.E.Sharpe, 1996), 86.
69 Aivars Stranga, “Baltic-Russian Relations: 1997” in: “The Is' Round Enlargements - 
Implications for Baltic Security”, Humanities and Social Science No, 2(19)/3 (20) 98 (Riga: 
University o f Latvia/Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1998), 167.
70MccGwire, 90
’ ’Vladimir Baranovsky, “Russia’s Security Interaction with Europe in a Post-Cold War 
Setting”, in: Clesse, Armand and Vitaly Zhurkin (eds.). The Future Role o f Russia in Europe 




























































































Union and treated as a defeated nation. The first phase of Russian foreign policy 
was complete subservience to the West which could not avoid to provoke very 
strong feelings o f national humiliation and as a backlash the growth of nationalist 
feelings. If the West treats Russia in the future as an equal partner in European 
security, in the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, in the Far East, wherever, 
then there is a very great chance that Russian policy in the near abroad will be not
aggressive, but benign and conducive to the role of international organisations and
72involvement of civilised nations in the resolution of those conflicts.
Describing the on-going process of constructing Russian foreign policy, 
scholars almost exclusively discuss the feeling of national humiliation and 
deprivation experienced by the politically and economically weakened Russia,72 3 
about its painful search for a new identity under the changing world order74 and 
its current drive to “prove something to the world”75 by, among other things, 
exploiting the issue of the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states. 
There also seems to be a consensus that at present, Russia’s need is more for 
psychological, symbolic security. However, the prospect of NATO expansion to 
the Baltics does not provide for such security and intensifies the feeling of 
political exclusion in Russia. Although many scholars admit that NATO is 
unlikely to enlarge to the Baltics,76 joining the alliance remains a foreign policy 
priority for the Baltic countries and constitutes a leitmotif of their foreign 
relations discourse. The enlargement project is not abandoned by the West 
either, which continues to add to uncertainty and frustration in Russia.
Again, a chain reaction goes on: Russia voices its protests against NATO’s 
expansion to the Baltics, the Baltic states use this as proof of Russia’s attempts 
to include them in its “sphere of influence”, Russia’s interference with the rights 
of the Russian-speakers serves as evidence of the danger the Baltic states face 
and proof of the necessity to join Western security structures. As follows from
72A. Arbatov, “Determinants of the Future Role o f Russia”, Conference Proceedings in: 
Clesse and Zhurkin (eds). The Future Role o f Russia... (1997), 85-86.
73 See for example: Nikolai Rudensky, “Russian Minorities in the Newly Independent States. 
An International Problem in the Domestic Context of Russia Today”, in: Szporluk, Roman 
(ed.) National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States o f Eurasia, (NY, London: 
M.E.Shape, 1994), 58.; also: S. Kortunov “‘Imperskoje’ i nacionalnoje v Rossijskom 
soznanii” [The “Imperial" and the National in Russian Consciousness], Mezhdunarodnaja 
Zhiznj, May 1998, available at:
http://www.diplomat.ru/russian/izdan_mfa/interlife/archive.html
74Sergei Blagovolin, “Poiski novogo mesta Rossii v menjajushchemsa mire’’[Russia’s Search 
for a New Place in a Changing World], Mezhdunarodnaja Zhiznj, April 1998, available at: 
http://www.diplomat.ru/russian/izdan_mfa/interlife/archive.html
1sPaul Goble, “Russian Culture and the Redefinition of M oscow’s Foreign Policy”, in: Clesse 
and Zhurkin (eds.) The Future Role o f Russia.. .(1997), 15.
76 For example, Haab, 122, Stranga (1996), 170, Hans Mouritzen, ‘T he West Dimension” in: 




























































































concerns voiced in the West (cited in section 2), the Baltic fears are projected to 
Western consciousness where suspicion with regard to Russia is still 
pronounced. Thus, a security conflict emerges between Russia and the Baltic 
states: both are involved in “securitising” themselves: the Baltics - from Russia 
by seeking alliance membership; Russia - from the potentially opposing alliance 
which it sees in the form of an enlarged NATO. The problem of this security 
dilemma is well described by McGwire who states: “We have still to accept that 
by unilaterally seeking to improve our own security we automatically reduce the 
security of others, meanwhile diminishing overall security by increasing the 
danger of conflict.”77
Russia’s “offence” at Western “mistrust” has resulted in frustration and 
attempts to reassert its role at least in the former Soviet space. This largely 
explains the occasional “great power” rhetoric of Russia directed at the Baltic 
states. However, this does not serve Russia’s desired goal, but increases 
opposition to it in the Baltics. As V. Baranovsky admits, Russia is now 
absorbed in “attempts to get a worthy place in the emerging international 
system. For Moscow, this goal (undoubtedly of paramount importance) has 
completely overshadowed the task of building a friendly environment in East- 
Central Europe...”78
The West’s overall treatment of Russia and Russia’s painful response to it 
has to a large extent determined the main points of its foreign policy on which a 
consensus among Russian political groupings, schools of international relations 
and holders of different world views seems to have been reached. Among them, 
as mentioned by A. Sergounin as a result of his comprehensive study of the 
stances various schools of political thought take on the future role of Russia in 
the world, are the following:
Russia should remain a major power with a major voice in the 
international community;
Russia has special geopolitical, strategic, economic and humanitarian 
interests in the post-Soviet geopolitical space and should be 
recognised as an unchallenged leader in this area;
NATO’s eastward expansion is the most serious challenge facing 
Russia in Europe. Russian diplomacy should prevent NATO 
enlargement, or at least minimise its effects, by excluding the Baltic 






























































































several years, and concluding an agreement between Brussels and 
Moscow to guarantee the security of the latter.79
The fact that this kind of security thinking prevails in Russia can perhaps be 
explained by the inability of the security policy-makers in both Russia and the 
West to go beyond their competing Cold-war perceptions of international 
relations. Nevertheless, however critical one might be of these stances, they 
should be taken as the starting point when assessing the possible implications of 
enlargement of the major Western organisations, particularly the EU and NATO 
to include the Baltic countries for Russia’s behaviour towards them. As the 
above analysis suggests, the Russian diplomatic pressure on Estonia and Latvia 
in the form of stressing the violations of the Russian-speakers’ rights is more 
determined by broader international political considerations as well as the 
domestic factors in Russia, rather than by Russia’s particular aspirations in 
Estonia and Latvia themselves. As pointed out by a number of analysts, these 
foreign policy stances are quite natural for Russia and in themselves represent 
no threat to security in Europe.80 What does seem to pose such a threat is, as 
McGwire puts it, “mounting frustration at what Russia sees as Western bad 
faith...”81
This brings us back to the question: is concern about the possible 
deterioration of Estonia’s and Latvia’s relations with Russia in the case of EU 
enlargement well-founded? More specifically: how likely is Russia to continue 
emphasising the issue of discrimination of the Russian-speaking minorities in 
its relations with Estonia and Latvia if they become EU members? What 
particular measures can be expected from Russia for exercising pressure on 
these states? How will the Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia respond to 
such pressure? In order to clarify these issues, it is necessary to assess the 
current relationship between Russia and the EU, Russia’s position towards the 
EU enlargement, public attitudes in Russia towards the “Russian-speakers” 
problem in the Baltics, and the extent to which the Russian-speakers in Estonia 
and Latvia identify with Russia.
79Alexander Sergounin, Post-Communist Security Thinking in Russia: Changing Paradigms 
(Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) Working Paper No. 4, 1997), 52.
80For example, Rudensky, 76, MccGwire, 87, also V. Shustov, "Rossija i problemi 
bezopasnosti v Baltijskom regione" [Russia and Security Problems in the Baltic Region], 






























































































4. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF EU ENLARGEMENT FOR RUSSIA’S 
BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MINORITIES IN 
ESTONIA AND LATVIA
Considering the complexity of the current still undefined “post Cold-war” state 
in which the international system finds itself, only vague predictions about 
future developments in any area of the world can be made. However, it is 
possible to foresee what consequences the EU’s enlargement will have on the 
position of Russia with respect to the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia 
and Latvia, however general such assumptions might be.
The great number of factors that might influence Russia’s behaviour makes 
it hardly possible to take account of all of them in advance. A number of 
scenarios may be envisaged. The Russian position will depend on the policies 
Estonia and Latvia continue to apply towards the minorities, the domestic 
political processes in Russia, Russia’s international position, its attitude towards 
the EU, whether NATO will expand to the Baltic states, whether the EU will 
assume a more pronounced military character, etc. However, it will also depend 
on such factors as the attitude of the Russian-speaking minorities towards 
Russia and public support in Russia itself for any kind of interference. The most 
credible scenario does not include the expansion of NATO to the Baltics, at 
least not in the foreseeable future. The analysis that follows will, therefore, 
concentrate on the implications of the enlargement of the EU, assuming that 
there will be no simultaneous enlargement of NATO.
Although the processes of EU and NATO enlargement are often discussed 
simultaneously they have fundamentally different implications for Russia’s 
behaviour. If NATO is seen in Russia as a hostile military alliance, the EU is 
perceived as a powerful civil and economic partner with which Russia is 
interested in establishing close co-operation.82 While opposing their entry into 
NATO, Russia supports the Baltic states’ joining the EU.83
Nevertheless, Latvian and Estonian analysts are careful about accepting 
Russia’s positive attitude. Aivars Stranga does not believe in Russia’s sincerely
820 .  Ivanov and I. Pozdnyakov, "Novije vozmozhnosti Rossii v Evropejskom Sojuze" 
[Russia’s New Opportunities in the European Union], Mezhdunarodnaja Zhiznj, March 1998, 
available at: http://www.diplomat.ru/russian/izdan_mfayinterlife/archive.html, 2; Horst
Guenter Krenzler, ‘T he Geostrategic and International Political Implications of EU 
Enlargement”, Report o f the Second Meeting o f the Working Group on the Eastern 
Enlargement o f the European Union, Rapporteur: Filippo Andreatta 98/2, Policy Papers, RSC 





























































































favourable position with regard to the Baltic states’ joining of the EU. He 
believes this to be just a temporary phenomenon, as Russia has no formal reason 
for objections yet, since the EU cannot be viewed as an alliance which is 
opposed to Russia. His view is that “whatever Russia might say about Baltic 
membership in the EU, membership would not correspond to Russia’s strategic 
goal of blocking any attempt by the Baltic countries to withdraw from Russia’s 
economic and political sphere of influence”84 The author is convinced that 
“Moscow continues to hope that Estonia, to say nothing of Latvia, will have a 
hard time achieving membership with so many non-citizens”.85 This opinion is 
shared by Estonian political scientists who accept the view of a German 
observer that “the strategic purpose of Russia in recent years has been to 
prevent the Baltic states from joining the European Union. All means have been 
used for this purpose, including slandering Estonia in international 
organisations.”86
This might be a valid assumption, as there certainly are forces in Russia 
that have not given up the idea of viewing the Baltics as part of the post-Soviet 
space subject to “integration” . Therefore, they would not like to see the Baltic 
states joining any powerful political and economic Western organisation as 
Russia would then face the danger of being isolated. As Stranga admits, 
“membership in the EU for Central and Eastern European countries would mean 
their true, deep and irreversible integration into the modem European economic 
and political system - even deeper integration than could ever be provided by 
NATO". He stresses that in this situation Russia could remain outside the broad 
integrated system, therefore the Russian Foreign Ministry sticks to the idea of 
preventing the EU enlargement.87
However, a number of arguments suggest that even if Russian opposition 
to EU enlargement is indeed in place, it is likely to fundamentally change as the 
enlargement draws closer and becomes ever more inevitable. During the 
“uncertain” pre-accession period some forces in Russia might still undertake 
attempts to delay the enlargement. However, once the enlargement becomes a 
fact, a radical revision of relations with Estonia and Latvia is likely to take 
place, contrary to the suspicions referred to in the earlier sections that relations
84 Stranga (1996), 155, Stranga (1998), 156.
85 Stranga (1998), 162.
86 Bemd Nielsen-Stokkebye, "Eine Politik der Verleumdungen: Rufiland suchl die 
Einbindung der baltischen Staaten in die europaische Gemeinschaft zu erschweren" 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Feb. 18, 1997, quoted in: Enn Haabsaar, Aksel Kirch 
“Influence of Russia on the Integration of Russians in Estonia: Historical Retrospection and 
Current Trends” in: Kirch, Aksel (ed.), Integration o f Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: 
History, Problems and Trends (Tallinn, 1997), 87.




























































































will deteriorate should Estonia and Latvia become EU members. Already now, 
after the 1997 invitation for accession negotiations, Russia has eased its 
criticism of Estonia (viewing it as the most likely candidate for accession) and 
has concentrated its attention on Latvia (which has a lesser chance of being 
admitted).88
The benefits Russia has gained so far from partnership with the EU and the 
ones it is likely to enjoy should Baltic membership in the EU become a reality, 
do not imply that Russia will start strongly objecting to the enlargement “when 
time is due”. Stranga is concerned that Russia will take a confrontational stance 
should the EU start resembling a military block similar to NATO through the 
development of the CFSP and the increased role of the WEU. However, it 
would be a rather short-sighted policy on the EU’s part to choose to oppose 
Russia. Today, the Union remains a ‘“security community’ in which the use of 
force or the threat of using force as mechanisms for regulating inter-state 
interaction are obsolete”.89 In its present form, the EU is perceived favourably 
in Russia.
In fact, opinions in Russia even favour Russia’s entry into the EU (65%), 
however distant such a prospect might appear.90 Readiness to join the EU was 
also expressed at the official level in Russia. Therefore, establishing closer ties 
with the EU is in the interests of both Russia and the Baltic states, suggesting 
that the EU’s enlargement would bring the countries closer together. It would 
provide common ground for dialogue, and is, therefore, more likely to result in 
the improvement of their bilateral relations than in their deterioration.
The suspected influence that Russia is trying to reinstate in the Baltics is 
generally feared by Estonia and Latvia in the form of definite measures that 
Russia could take towards them in the name of coercing them to ease the 
policies with respect to the Russian-speakers (such as, for example, economic 
sanctions). The Baltic states repeatedly express their concern about perceived 
infringement by Russia upon their sovereignty and, as has been shown earlier, 
do not rule out even Russian military intervention at the perceptive level. 
However, the likelihood of such actions from the Russian side does not appear 
very high and its probability appears even lower in the context of the EU
88 Ibid, 164.
89 Dr. Angel Vinas, Director of the Multilateral Relations Department of the European 
Commission, cited in: Delegation of the European Commission in Latvia/Latvian Institute of 
International Affairs, “Building an Inclusive Society for Europe.. .(1998), 30.
90Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, “New Russia Barometer IH: The Results”, Studies in 




























































































enlargement into Estonia and Latvia. As admitted by Russian experts 
themselves, Russia has hardly any tools for influencing Baltic policies:
The problem of national minorities has damaged Russian-Baltic relations, delayed 
Russian troop withdrawal and destabilised the whole regional system in 
international relations. What steps could be taken by Russia to improve the human 
rights situation in the Baltic states when it has limited resources to influence the 
Baltic states in this regard? The use of force is ruled out. Russia has only
diplomatic and economic instruments at its disposal as a last resort to prevent
91discrimination against Russians there.
As far as economic pressure is concerned, evidence suggests that its 
application would be rather harmful first of all for Russia itself, particularly if 
Estonia and Latvia become EU members. Russia is fervently seeking to expand 
co-operation with the EU, particularly in the economic sphere. The EU is 
Russia’s biggest economic partner, accounting for around 40% of Russia’s 
external trade turnover. It is also the largest investor in Russia’s economy, 
providing 40% of all foreign investment into Russia. Besides, EU assistance to 
Russia in the framework of the TACIS programme is immense, making the EU 
also the largest Russia’s financial benefactor. The Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreement between the EU and Russia which entered into force in December, 
1997 provides for the overall favourable conditions for Russia in trade relations 
with the EU. The EU, for example, has lifted all quotas on the import of Russian 
goods and granted Russia ‘most favoured nation’ treatment in the field of export 
and import taxation.* 92
Therefore, it would not be appropriate for Russia to compromise its 
economic ties with EU members. Besides, the events of March-April 1998, 
when Russia actually attempted to apply economic pressure on Latvia in 
response to the dispersion by the Latvian police of a demonstration by 
predominantly Russian-speaking pensioners’ , have shown that such measures 
prove unprofitable for Russia itself, as the transit of Russian oil through 
alternative routes bypassing the Latvian ports is connected with considerable 
extra expenses.
Besides, economic pressure provoked mixed reactions among the Russian- 
speakers in Latvia who were directly affected by it, especially the ones involved 
in businesses largely dependent on co-operation with Russia. Thus, occasional 
Russian warnings concerning the possibility of applying economic measures to 
Estonia and Latvia appear to represent mere “sabre rattling” rather than to imply
01 Sergounin (1998), 42.




























































































dangerous action. As admitted by V. Baranovsky, so far, the “overall 
assertiveness of Russia (...) manifested with respect to the Baltic States (...) is 
almost exclusively declarative in character.”93
There is evidence that membership of the Baltic states in the EU is 
regarded in Russia with growing enthusiasm. Politicians and experts close to 
Russia’s foreign policy-makers admit that it is in Russia’s interest to have a 
stable and economically-developed country providing new markets and trade 
opportunities next to its border. Zaneta Ozolina refers to the member of 
Russia’s President’s Advisory Board on Foreign Affairs Andrei Karaganov who 
commented that prosperity on Russia’s borders means prosperity for the 
country. Latvia would thus be a gateway to the EU for Russia, especially taking 
into account the highly developed transportation system in Latvia which is 
widely used by Russia for its transit to Europe. There is a popular idea of 
creating a “tenth multimodal transport corridor” through Latvia for the 
transportation of goods from the West to the East and in the other direction.94
The positive implications of the EU’s enlargement to the Baltic states are 
also examined by Dmitri Trenin, Deputy Director of the Moscow Carnegie 
Centre. He mentions the following points:
• Opportunities for profitable capital investment. As soon as the Baltics join 
the EU, capital from Russia will flow there. Those will be investments in the 
infrastructures (ports, etc.) that serve the transit ways between Russia and the 
West.
• Establishment of a privileged relationship with the EU. The author stresses 
the importance of the role of the Russian speaking population in the 
economies of Latvia and Estonia. Through the Russian-speaking 
businessmen, Russia will “step with one foot into the EU.”
• Stimulation of co-operation at the regional level. Trenin foresees that under 
the impact of the EU, the Russian northwest with St. Petersburg as its centre 
will have a chance for accelerated development. Instead of the division line 
or a military stronghold currently represented by the northwest, it will 
transform into a broad thoroughfare of close contact with Europe:
“Closer co-operation with Estonia and, through her, with the West will provide 
opportunities to improve the economic situation in the area west of the Leningrad 
region. The Kaliningrad, Pskov, and Novgorod regions, which play the same role of
93Baranovsky, 177.




























































































transit territories as the Baltic states, will be in a position to prosper as a result of the 
creation of east-west transport corridors (for instance St. Petersburg - Tallinn - Riga - 
Kaunas - Warsaw; Riga- Kaliningrad - Gdansk) and the establishment of transborder 
Euro-regions and common links with the former Baltic Rim. In the long run, such a 
development will lead to the practical expansion of integrated Europe, this time within 
Russia’s borders”.95
The projection of this positive thinking will depend on the good will of all 
sides and their ability of give up the confrontational mentality. Presently it 
seems probable that while the EU enlargement into the Baltic states is still in 
progress, Russian rhetoric concerning minorities, as well as diplomatic pressure, 
might continue if discrimination against the Russian-speakers goes on; 
however, it is improbable for Russia to go beyond diplomatic means with 
respect to Estonia and Latvia as EU member states. Thus, with the enlargement, 
deliberate Russian pressure is more likely to soften, rather than become more 
assertive.
As to the minority issue itself, the current EU policy of applying 
diplomatic pressure on Estonia and Latvia has so far led to positive outcomes, 
primarily to the change of citizenship legislation. If it continues to succeed, the 
issue of citizenship will gradually cease to be as sensitive as it is presently. 
Although all of the problems facing the minorities are not likely to disappear 
(issues of language usage, education, equality at the labour market, etc. will 
remain on the agenda for many years to come), the settlement of at least the 
problem of statelessness will leave nationalistic forces in Russia with fewer 
issues to be exploited for domestic purposes. Besides, the Russian-speakers in 
Estonia and Latvia are even more enthusiastic about their countries’ 
membership of the EU than are the Estonians/Latvians themselves.96
This is also noted by Trenin who considers that the Baltic states’ 
membership in the EU will promote the integration of the Russian-speaking 
population. Since the Russian-speakers comprise a sizeable share in the capitals 
and main port cities of the Baltics, closer relations between Russia and the EU 
will imply real economic assistance to the Russian-speaking residents. 
Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians will quickly be integrated into the
95 Dmitri Trenin, Baltic Chance. The Baltic States. Russia and the West in the Emerging 
Greater Europe (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/Camegie Moscow Center, 
1997), 36-37.
9678% of Russian-speakers in Estonia favour the country’s accession to the EU as compared 
to 59% o f Estonians; in Latvia, the respective figures are 66% and 52%. Richard Rose, "New 




























































































new inter-ethnic communities of the Baltic countries. The Baltic Sea coasts will 
see the new ‘Euro-Russians.’97
EU membership will increase the value of Latvian citizenship through 
which EU citizenship will become acquirable. This will provide incentives for 
non-citizens to take a more active interest in naturalisation. The same is true for 
the Latvian language that, in the case of accession, will become one of the 
official languages of the EU. Thus, those having a poor command of this 
language will have more incentive to improve it.98 All this implies that 
provocative gestures from the Russian side that could place the Russian- 
speakers in a confrontation with the EU are not likely to be welcomed by the 
minorities. Undoubtedly, Estonia and Latvia have a major role to play in the 
development of events as the policies they adopt with regard to the Russian- 
speakers will be the major determinants of future public attitudes in the two 
countries, as well as determining relations with Russia.
As to the fear of Russian military intervention in the Baltics, the majority 
of observers argue that this is a complete misperception. Russian sources 
unanimously state that Russia has no territorial aspirations whatsoever in the 
Baltic region. Russia’s opposition to the Baltic states’ joining of NATO does 
not imply that Russia would again like to subjugate them, particularly through 
the use of the Russian-speaking minorities. Russia sees the EU as the optimal 
guarantor of stability and security in the Baltic region and is determined to co­
operate with the EU on Baltic security issues.99 Russia favours the Baltic states’ 
non-alignment with any military blocks that might be regarded as a risk to 
Russia’s national security, but it does not follow that the sovereignty or 
territorial integrity of the Baltic states is threatened by Russia because of that. It 
does not seem logical, therefore, that Russia would attempt any aggressive 
action in the Baltics, let alone if they become EU members.
As McGwire concludes after a study of Russia’s imperial history: “The 
historical record does not support the belief that Russia is inherently 
expansionist; there is no reason to suppose that it has an urge to add to its 
existing territories.”100 He also states that “while there are many calls to restore 
Russia’s ‘greatness’, the political drive to reconstitute the Soviet Union or the
97 Trenin, 36.
98 Juris Kanels, former Latvian Ambassador to the EU, cited in: Delegation of the European 
Commission in Latvia/Latvian Institute o f International Affairs, “Building an Inclusive 






























































































tsarist empire is absent, as is the military capability to do so.”101 Kortunov and 
Shustov emphasise the fact that the Russian army has been completely 
withdrawn from the Baltic states, which is the most salient manifestation of the 
non-existence of any aggressive plans on the Russian part with regard to the 
Baltics.102 Rudensky also stresses that the “patriotic propaganda effort intended 
to use the plight of minorities to trigger violent nationalistic outbursts in Russia 
has (...) evoked only limited response among the population at large.”103
This view is supported by social survey data which reflect that the 
Russians in Russia give very low priority to the problems connected with the 
Russian-speaking minorities outside Russia, and in the Baltic states in 
particular. It is the political elite that repeatedly stresses the issue. As is often 
the case in transitional societies, governments unable to offer effective 
economic solutions in a crisis environment, resort to nationalistic argumentation 
for attracting the electorate. However, it appears that the Russian population is 
not very likely to be receptive to any irredentist calls Russian nationalists may 
voice and would hardly be prepared to fight for the Russians in the Baltics.
Thus, when asked to set priorities among their main concerns, only 4% 
mentioned the treatment of Russians in other republics. Similarly, only 6% 
indicated “Russia’s place in the world today” as their main concern. By 
comparison, issues such as rising prices, increasing crime, low wages, 
governmental ineffectiveness, and ecological pollution were given much higher 
priority (69%, 51%, 50%, 35% and 15% respectively).104 Besides, when asked 
to state whether the Russian government should put making Russia a world 
superpower first or concentrate primarily on the domestic issues, 89% expressed 
their preference for the latter leaving only 11% preoccupied with the 
superpower status of Russia.105
Furthermore, those polled gave the lowest priority to the Baltic states when 
asked to specify with which former USSR republics Russia should have a close 
union. Only 40% mentioned Latvia and 39% Estonia. In comparison, closer ties 
with Belarus were favoured by 89% of the respondents, Ukraine by 87%, 
Moldova by 64%, Kazakhstan by 74%.106 Finally, in their assessment of the
10Tbid, 84.
102Kortunov, 5, Shustov, 2.
103Rudensky, 75.
l04Rose and Haerpfer, “New Russia Barometer HI...(1995) question 24, p. 22. Note: three 
options could be chosen.
105Ibid., question 26, p.24.
'“ Richard Rose, “New Russia Barometer IV: Survey Results”, Studies in Public Policy, No. 




























































































measures Russia could take if Russians in the near abroad were threatened, the 
majority of 96% supported negotiations, 67% approved of economic pressure, 
66% of resettling Russian nationals in Russia, and only a minority of 17% 
supported taking military action.107
As to the minorities themselves, they can hardly be regarded as Russian 
irredenta or “fifth column”, since, as surveys show, their identification with 
Russia is not very strong: their identities and loyalties lie largely with Estonia 
and Latvia. As R. Rose points out: “even if the Kremlin and Members of 
Parliament think of Russians in the Baltic states as “their” people, it does not 
follow that Russian-speakers in the Baltics feel a similar nearness.”108
In fact, the majority of Russian-speakers in Latvia (56%) consider Latvian 
Russians to be a different people from the Russians in Russia. Only 30% see 
them as one single people, with the rest undecided.109 Various surveys show that 
the overwhelming majority consider Estonia/Latvia their homeland, only a 
small fraction identifying primarily with Russia in this respect (predominantly 
the older generation that spent many years living in Russia). Evidence of the 
Russian-speakers’ loyalty towards Estonia and Latvia is presented by their 
strong interest in acquiring local citizenship as well as their views on civic 
duties that all residents owe to the state in which they live. The Baltic 
Barometer III survey revealed that over 90% of the Russian-speakers in Estonia 
and Latvia consider it their duty to obey all the country’s laws, respect the 
nation’s flag and learn the official language, 77% in Estonia and 83% in Latvia 
consider it a duty to pay taxes on all their income and, what is striking 
considering that non-citizens are not entitled to serve in the army, 74% of 
Estonia’s Russian-speakers and 78% of those in Latvia consider military service 
one of the basic duties everyone in the country should perform.110
Furthermore, the majority of the Russian-speakers in Latvia do not support 
Latvia joining the Commonwealth of Independent States and believe that Latvia 
will never become part of Russia again.111 Similarly, in Estonia, only 22% of the 
Russian-speakers think that Russia might use military force in the future against 
Estonia claiming to protect the residing there non-Estonians, with 69%
107Ibid., figure 7, p.49.
l08Richard Rose, “Baltic Trends: Studies in Co-operation, Conflict, Rights and Obligations”, 
Studies in Public Policy, No. 288 (Glasgow G1 1XH: University o f Strathclyde, 1997), 31.
109Baltic Data House, figure 134, p.126.
"°Rose, "New Baltic Barometer IH...”(1997), questions 115-119, pp. 38-39.




























































































believing that it will not happen.'12 In the event of an armed conflict with 
Russia, only 5% of Latvia’s non-citizens said they would side with Russia, 51% 
remaining neutral, 24% siding with Latvia and the rest undecided. Among 
citizens-Russians the figure of those prepared to side with Latvia was higher 
(36%), but of those siding with Russia it was lower (2%)'13 which confirms the 
significance of citizenship status for the formation of the individuals’ civic 
consciousness.
Another piece of evidence that does not support the “fifth column” 
perception of the Russian-speaking minorities is the fact that there have been 
practically no claims for any kind of territorial autonomy for the Russians 
within the Baltic states. In the Estonian city of Narva with the highest 
concentration of the Russian-speaking population, opinions that it should be 
granted a special autonomous status were strongest in 1992 (with 50% of the 
respondents supporting such an option), but later weakened. In 1993, there was 
even a referendum on autonomy which, although successful, was declared 
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, in 1996, 80% of the Narvans considered that 
Narva should remain a regular city in Estonia and only 17% favoured autonomy 
or some other kind of special status for the city. Notably, only 1% supported its 
incorporation into the Russian Federation.12 314
The number of citizens of the Russian Federation in Estonia and Latvia, is 
not likely to grow. As shown by the Baltic Barometer II survey, over 95% of the 
Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia do not plan to acquire Russian 
citizenship. It may, therefore, be concluded that whoever was interested in 
taking Russian citizenship has already done so and, in the event if Russia tries 
to legitimately interfere in the domestic affairs of Estonia and Latvia in the 
name of protecting the interests of its citizens, it will have only limited 
opportunities for doing so.
Besides, the Russian-speakers are not a politically cohesive block. They 
hold different political views and do not necessarily all identify with a single 
“Russian-oriented” political organisation. When asked by the Baltic Barometer 
III whether they feel close to any political party or movement, only 10% of
112"Attitudes Toward Russia: the Biggest Divide in the Estonians’ and Non-Estonians’ 
Mentality” in: Open Estonia Foundation Research Project (Tallinn: Open Estonia 
Foundation, 1997), available at: http://www.oef.org.ee/integrenglish/seven/html
ll3Baltic Data House, figure 44, p.62.
1,4Sergei Gorohhov, “Integration in Practice: the Case of Narva”, in: Kirch, Aksel (ed.), 
Integration o f Non-Estonians into Estonian Society... (1997), 128. Note: combined results of 




























































































Estonian Russian-speakers and 27% of the Latvian ones replied positively 
(figures almost identical with those for Estonians and Latvians).
Most of the Russian-speakers with political affiliation in Latvia (35%) 
identified with the Democratic Party “Saimnieks” (a party with a centrist 
orientation and mostly comprised of Latvians), 21% indicated the Party of 
People’s Concord (an opposition party advocating the granting of citizenship to 
non-citizens, facilitation of naturalisation and integration of Russian-speakers 
into Latvian society) and only 13% claimed affiliation to the Latvian Socialist 
Party (a leftist political organisation fervently advocating the rights of non­
citizens. This party is most often associated in Latvia with the “former 
communists”).115 The survey of Latvian inhabitants ‘Towards a Civic Society” 
conducted more recently than the Baltic Barometer III revealed an even greater 
split in the political views of non-citizens in Latvia. When asked for which 
party they would vote if they had the right to, the majority (47.2%) expressed 
uncertainty. “Equal rights” (an opposition movement generally supporting the 
view that systematic human rights violations take place in Latvia) was 
mentioned by 12.5% of the respondents, “Saimnieks” by 8.3%, the Party of 
People’s Concord by 7.3%, and the Socialist Party by 2.1%, with the rest of the 
opinions split among other parties.116
In Estonia, the Baltic Barometer III survey showed a greater coherence of 
political views. However, only half of Estonia’s Russian-speakers identified 
with the Russian Party of Estonia, 19% with the Estonian Centre party and 8% 
with the Estonian United People’s Party. Certainly, political affiliation is not 
permanent and may often change. Language, education and labour policies 
advocated by the “Latvian” and “Estonian” parties will very much determine 
whether these parties will enjoy further support from the Russian-speakers.
Generally, the above facts suggest that even if there were attempts on the 
part of Russia to somehow mobilise the Russian-speaking minorities for 
projecting its political goals in connection with its role in the world, they would 
be unlikely to gain support in Estonia in Latvia among the minorities 
themselves. Besides, the public in Russia does not appear to manifest its deep 
concern for the problems of the Russian-speakers in the Baltics, nor enthusiasm 
for taking assertive measures in their interests. It is the strict Estonian and 
Latvian ethnic policies that might consolidate the Russian-speakers in the two 
countries and create an opposing block, but not the calls from Russia. However, 
the political will of the Baltic states to join the EU will hopefully prevent them 
from further tightening the citizenship, language, education and labour policy.
ll5Rose, "New Baltic Barometer III...” (1997), question 133, pp. 42-43.




























































































Thus, the evidence analysed in this section generally leads to the 
conclusion that in the case of EU expansion to Estonia and Latvia, the bilateral 
relations of these countries with Russia are more likely to improve rather than 
worsen (as suggested by a number of authors), as a deliberate exacerbation of 
relations with Estonia and Latvia as ELF member states would largely go against 
Russia’s interests, as well as against the interests of the Russian-speaking 
minorities in the two countries. As the above analysis suggests, there is a 
growing understanding of this in Russia. Although Russia’s behaviour will 
depend on a whole set of factors, the most realistic assessment of developments 
does not imply a serious deterioration of Baltic-Russian relations, particularly if 
these relations are seen as ELF-Russian relations. Therefore, concern over the 
possibility of a negative development of events involving the Russian-speaking 
minorities in Estonia and Latvia should be assessed more realistically in Europe 
and should not be exaggerated.
CONCLUSION
Analysing why the EU actively conditions the membership of Estonia and 
Latvia upon the successful integration of the Russian-speaking minorities into 
Estonian and Latvian societies, it becomes evident that the primary concerns of 
the Union are those of improving the democratic arrangements in the two Baltic 
countries, minimising conflict potential and avoiding further segregation of 
their societies. However, judging from the concerns sometimes raised in the 
West with regard to the way Russia might behave towards Estonia and Latvia in 
the future, namely, if those countries become EU member states, it appears that 
the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia are still perceived as a 
security problem with international implications.
The classic triangle of “nation state” / “national minority” / “external 
homeland” in which the relations among the three actors often lead to conflict, 
is present also the case of Estonia/Latvia, their Russian-speakers and Russia. 
However, as evidence shows, in this case the triangle is largely non-conflictual. 
The enlargement of the major international organisations - the EU and NATO is 
still in progress, and the outcome of this process is not evident for Russia. 
Uncertainty with regard to its security and the overall symbolic international 
status, largely explains Russia’s use of the issue of the Russian-speaking 
minorities to apply pressure on Estonia and Latvia thus far .
Undoubtedly, the current Russian stance with regard to Estonia and Latvia 
worries the Baltic states as well as raising concerns in Europe. However, as 




























































































and is unlikely to result in a serious deterioration of its bilateral relations with 
Estonia and Latvia or in the destabilisation of security in the Baltic region. 
Besides, among Russian-speaking minorities, perceptions of the potential of 
being exploited in Russia’s self-interest should the circumstances bring about 
such a scenario, is often overestimated by outside observers. As has been 
demonstrated, the Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia hardly constitute 
classic irredentist communities, as they only weakly identify with Russia and 
their sense of belonging as well as their loyalties and political affiliations are 
associated with their homelands, i.e. Estonia and Latvia.
Considering Russia’s overall positive attitude towards the EU and the 
importance it attaches to economic co-operation with the EU, as well as to co­
operation in the field of international politics and security, the perception that it 
would deliberately seek to exacerbate difficulties in relations with Estonia and 
Latvia as EU members seems unfounded. Besides, with the entry of Estonia and 
Latvia into the EU, the cause of the problem - that is, the discriminatory 
treatment of the Russian-speaking minorities by the Estonian and Latvian 
governments is likely to become less pronounced.
The facilitation of the naturalisation procedure in Latvia and the granting 
of citizenship to stateless children bom in Estonia and Latvia after 
independence has been achieved partly owing to the EU interference. It can be 
hoped, therefore, that the EU will remain as influential an international actor as 
it is at present, and that membership of Estonia and Latvia in the EU will 
contribute positively to the integration processes in their societies. As Dr. Angel 
Vinas points out: “the countries and people that have not long ago recovered 
their own sovereignty after years of Soviet occupation or domination will find 
out that membership of the Union will liberate them from the remaining 
shackles of their own past “thus allowing them to experience the “external and 
liberating effects of EU membership”.117 As noted by professor Rasma 
Karklina, the desire to join the EU is a unifying factor in the Latvian society 
that cuts across the lines of ethnicity, citizenship and other cleavages.118
The foreign and security policy of the Baltic states is presently shaped 
predominantly in realist terms. The international system is perceived in terms of 
opposing spheres of influence, competing national interests, power balance and 
so on. The same is true about the foreign and security policy of Russia. Thus, a 
security conflict has emerged between the Baltic states and Russia over the
117 Vinas, cited in: Delegation of the European Commission in Latvia/Latvian Institute of 
International Affairs, “Building an Inclusive Society for Europe...(1998), 31.
118 Rasma Karklina, cited in: Delegation of the European Commission in Latvia/Latvian 




























































































issue of which international actor would best provide for the security of the 
Baltic region. Baltic and Russian views differ on this issue, and the Russian- 
speaking communities of Estonia and Latvia are perfect vehicles for both sides 
to advocate their points-of-view.
However, with the enlargement of the EU into the Baltic states, the 
perceptions of the international world order may change both in Russia and in 
the Baltics under the influence of, among other things, the foreign and security 
policy agenda of the EU which is taking shape in less pronounced “power 
politics” terms and in which positivism prevails over the “negativism” now 
dominating the Baltic and the Russian security agendas.119 As A. Sergounin 
points out, speaking about Russia, the current predominance of 
realist/geopolitical concepts in Russia’s foreign and security policy is due to the 
fact that the country still finds itself in the process of nation-building and 
searching for a national identity.120 The Baltic states, where statehood is still in 
its early stage, are faced with similar challenges. In fact, this is also true about 
the domestic politics of the Baltic states and Russia.
However, the entry of the Baltic States into the European Union may 
gradually influence the security agenda of Estonia and Latvia, as well as of 
Russia. Once again quoting Sergounin:
“a completely different set of priorities could be the focus of future security debates: 
ensuring domestic stability and territorial integrity, preventing the rise of hostile powers 
and alliances may be replaced by concerns such as the environment, mass disease, 
international terrorism and narcobusiness, migration, the increasing vulnerability of 
economic and information networks, and so on.”121
In this case, the importance now attached to the issue of the Russian-speaking 
minorities in Estonia and Latvia for the overall security of the region is likely to 
diminish. However, the attitude of the EU towards Russia, and the rhetoric 
coming from Western Europe in general, will significantly condition the shifts 
in both the Baltic and the Russian security mentalities.
Jekaterina Dorodnova
119See, for example: Reinhard Rummel, “CFSP’s Strategic Areas of Innovation: Instruments 
and Contents” and Fraser Cameron, “The Future of the CFSP: Measures for Improvements”, 
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